effect of unearned income of the father may be different from that accruing to the mother. It is this joint hypothesis which will be tested using a large scale household survey from Brazil.
Second, we shall present evidence on whether parents display gender preferences. If the common preference model of household resource allocation is incorrect then these gender preferences should also be reflected in differential resource allocations depending on who controls income.
II. Models of Household Behavior
Models of household behavior considered in this paper can all be cast in the same framework as a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function. For a particular household, welfare in any period, W, is a function of M individual utility functions, U1, U2,. . ., UM, where M is the number of household members: ( 
1) W = W[U1(X, Z), ... . U(, Z)]
X is a vector of commodity demands including leisure, and Z is a vector of home-produced (or nonmarketed) goods such as child health and quality. If there are N goods then X will be of dimension N*M with typical element, Xi, the consumption of the ith good by the mth member. The model is quite general; it imposes weak separability between the felicity functions and separability between the inputs into the Z-good production functions and the elements of X in each felicity function. If the utility of member m does not enter the aggregator function, then it will be assigned a weight of zero. In the special case that the utility of a member, m, depends only on his own consumption then Xi, will carry weight zero for all 1 # m in the utility function Ur. This represents egotistical preferences (Chiappori 1988a ).
In most survey data, it is only household consumption of good i, Xi = EmXim, rather than individual consumption, which is observed, although leisure is the exception to this rule. Household welfare is maximized subject to the budget constraint: In the empirical work below, we shall maintain the strong assumption that unearned income is exogenous and therefore ignore the fact that current unearned income probably reflects past labor supply decisions. It would be preferable to model household resource allocation within a dynamic framework or, perhaps, using the level of resources brought to the marriage (Schultz 1989 ); neither option is feasible with the data used in this paper. The simplest static model of the household assumes either that all household members have exactly the same preferences or that a dictator makes all allocation decisions in which case the aggregator function W(.) assigns a zero weight to all but one member of the household's utility function. For the purposes of this paper, the two assumptions are observationally equivalent and we refer to them as the common preference model; it is often called the neoclassical model and underlies Becker's (1964 Becker's ( , 1974 Becker's ( , 1981 ) discussion of household formation. For this model to be correct, it is necessary that the household act as if it pools all unearned income and thus the demand functions depend only on total household unearned income and not its components. Chiappori (1988a, 1988b) has made the appealing argument that imposing a bargaining concept on the household allocation problem is quite restrictive and these restrictions are hard to test. He proposes assuming only that household allocations are Pareto-efficient (see, also, Kooreman 1990). As long as members are not purely egotistical then Chiappori argues the implications of his model cannot be distinguished from the neoclassical model except within a revealed preference or nonparametric framework (Afriat 1967 , Varian 1982 .
This seems overly strong. In the absence of complete pooling of income, a change in nonwage income under the control of different members will have the same effect on demands only if the dictatorial model is correct. If household allocations are assumed to be Pareto-efficient, but parents have different preferences, then demands should depend on prices and individual components of unearned income: 5. Ulph (1988), Folbre (1984) , and Blumberg (1988) argue that bargaining power depends on the proportion of total income each member controls. This would be true if labor supplies are exogenously given and no household member has a claim on the earnings of another member if the household splits up. The empirical results reviewed in Blumberg make this assumption and are, therefore, hard to interpret. The implication that unearned income should enter the demand functions (4) in the same way, independent of the source of income is a key feature of the dictatorial model, which is not shared by the general model (4) or either of the class of individual preference models discussed above. This suggests a simple and appealing test of the common preference model against a broad class of alternatives.6 Rejection of the equality of income effects does not imply acceptance of any one of these alternatives; the fact there are plausible alternatives does, however, suggest the test has some power.
McElroy and Homey (1981) report equality of income effects as one of the tests of the bargaining model. Using National Longitudinal Survey data, they find they cannot reject the hypothesis that nonwage income accruing to the husband, wife and other members of the household have the same effect on male and female labor supply.
Using household expenditure data from Thailand, Schultz (1988 Schultz ( , 1989 Schultz ( , 1990 demonstrates that a woman's unearned income has a significantly larger negative effect on the probability that she enters the wage labor force than does her husband's unearned income. The reverse is true for men. He also examines the impact of nonwage income on fertility rates: more unearned income in the hands of women tends to (significantly) raise fertility; it is little affected by husband's nonwage income.
III. Nutrient Intake and Indicators of Child Health
This paper will study three levels of data from a large-scale household survey. First, at the household level, nutrient intakes-in particular calories and protein-are considered. Second, for each woman who has ever borne a child, we examine the determinants of fertility and child survival rates. Third, two anthropometric indicators-height (conditional on age) and weight (conditional on height)-for children less than 8 years old are analyzed. The two nutrient intakes are X-goods and the four health indicators are Z-goods in the demand functions, (4).
Analysis of nutrient intakes is a straightforward extension of demand analysis; see Behrman and Deolalikar 1988 for a review and discussion 6. Some of the Marxian-feminist models assert that women's bargaining power is independent of the resources she controls but depends on societal norms (Hartmann 1981 (12) X = MP + e, where M is a vector of prices, including wages, and unearned income of household members. In the absence of price data, location dummies are included; instead of mother's and father's wages-which are observed only for those participating in the wage market-parental education is included. Unearned income accruing to the mother, father, and all others are entered separately. Estimated variance-covariance matrices are corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity using the infinitesimal jackknife (Jaeckel 1972 , Efron 1982 ) also proposed by White (1980).
IV. Data and Empirical Model
The common preference model will be tested with Brazilian survey data collected in 1974/75. Family structure in Brazil has changed substantially over the last three decades; see Oliveira and Berquo (1988) for a review and Goldani (1989) for a discussion. Whereas in 1960, 46 percent of the population was urbanized, this proportion had risen to almost 80 percent in 1984 and much of this growth may be attributed to migration. Furthermore, in Brazil, as in much of Latin America, women are more likely to migrate so that the ratio of women to men is higher in cities (1.05) than the countryside (0.94) and is very high in some cities (1.16 in the Northeast city of Fortaleza, for example). At the same time, there has been a tripling of female labor force participation rates to about 36 percent in 1984 and an even more dramatic increase in the proportion of women earning an income (from 7 percent in 1960 to 33 percent in 1984). Over 40 percent of women earn less than the minimum wage and, on average, they earn less than men; more surprisingly, perhaps, the ratio of female to male wages is smallest for illiterates (93 percent) and greatest for those with college education (only 36 percent) (Neuhouser 1989 ).
While fertility rates have declined from 6.3 in 1960 to 3.6 in 1984 and the infant mortality rate has been cut in half (IBGE 1988), the age at first union and probability of being married have remained remarkably stable. Over this period, 88 percent of men aged 40-49 were married as were 81 percent of women in the 30-39 year age group. The influence of the Catholic church has, however, been eroded: the proportion of marriages performed solely in church has fallen by 50 percent; civil marriages have risen in popularity and there has been a doubling of consensual unions-especially among young adults (Goldani 1989 , Henriques 1988 .
In spite of these changes, Brazil remains a machista society (Neuhouser 1989), suggesting the dictatorial model of household decision-making should perform well. Sociologists, however, argue that even within In the survey, each member of the household was asked about their own income and nonwage income was broken down into income from pensions, social security and workers compensation, rents and income from physical assets, financial assets, gifts, and other irregular income. Among urban households in the survey, 44 percent of all men and 36 percent of all women report some income other than earnings. In rural households, however, there is very little reported unearned income; 29 percent of all men and only 11 percent of women report positive unearned income. The very low proportion of women with unearned income is probably due, in part, to the survey design. All income from rural enterprises (including farms) was attributed to the head of the household. Women's unearned income is, therefore, probably underreported and men's overreported. This will seriously contaminate tests of the allocation model and so, in this paper, only urban households are included: a sample of over 25,000 households.9 8. The data used in this study cover the Northeast, Southeast (Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Parana), Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Brasilia. 9. A subset of the estimates reported below have been replicated with the rural data. In most models, we cannot reject the common preference model because income effects are very imprecisely measured.
Among urban households, almost a quarter of men's income comes from nonearned sources. A little less than half of that is from pensions and social security; a quarter is returns on financial or physical assets. About 40 percent of income reported by women is not earned: relative to men, a higher proportion is from pensions (over 50 percent) and social security (almost 20 percent); rather less is from financial or physical assets (13 percent).
Table la presents mean total and unearned income by deciles of per capita expenditure (PCE).10 Total annual household income is, on average, Cr$31,401.11 Almost a quarter is from nonearned sources and this proportion tends to increase with PCE, although households in the bottom decile report relatively high proportions of unearned income.12 Fathers account for 76 percent of total household income, mothers receive 13 percent, and the rest accrues to other household members. These ratios are remarkably stable across the expenditure distribution. In contrast, the proportion of unearned income attributed to the father rises from about 55 percent in the bottom decile to 75 percent at the top; the mother's sharefalls from 37 percent at the bottom to about half that at the top. If the individual preference model is correct then mother's unearned income should have a bigger influence on consumption patterns at the bottom of the PCE distribution.
On average, men report Cr$5,500 in unearned income; women report about a quarter of that. A third of all men and a fifth of women report some income from nonwage sources so that conditional on receiving nonwage income, the mother-father differential is much smaller: on average, the mother receives just over Cr$7,500 and the father about twice as much.
Table Ib presents mean per capita calorie and protein intakes measured at the household level. Both tend to rise with expenditure although the relationship between calories and expenditure is apparently quite nonlinear. When daily per capita calories reaches about 2,400, it remains constant even as per capita expenditure increases.
Information on children ever born and the proportion who survived to the survey date are recorded for each woman aged 14 to 55. The income characteristics of this dataset are remarkably similar to the household level data in Table la . Mean fertility levels and survival rates by deciles 10. Since measured income is likely to reflect a larger transitory component than expenditure, per capita expenditure can be thought of as a first approximation to a longer-run welfare indicator. 11. Approximately U.S.$2,000. 12. It is likely that some of these households suffered a temporary earnings shock, part of which was transmitted into expenditures; hence, the relatively low share of earned income. The analysis of anthropometric data is restricted to children less than 8 years old and so younger (and poorer) households are included in this level of data. The average urban child in Brazil has the same weight, conditional on height, as the median child in the United States; the longer run indicator of nutritional status, height for age, suggests, however, that Brazilian children are not as well nourished. There is considerably more heterogeneity in the shorter than longer-run nutritional indicators; the standard deviations of weight for height and height for age are 13.7 and 6.6, respectively. Weight for height and, particularly, height for age, increase with PCE; on average, a child in a household at the top decile is the same height as the U.S. median child.
Relative to the household level data, in the child level sample, average income is about 20 percent lower. Unearned income accounts for a smaller proportion of total income (17 percent), the father controls relatively more (80 percent), and the proportions of mothers and fathers reporting any income from nonwage sources are slightly smaller (14 percent and 34 percent, respectively). The relationship between all these variables and per capita expenditure is, however, very similar in all three levels of data.
V. Testing the Common Preference Model

A. Tests of Equality of Income Effects
The reduced form coefficient estimates for unearned income are reported in Table 2 for each of the six resource allocation outcomes. Household nutrient intakes are in logarithms and the anthropometric indicators are logarithms of U.S. medians. All the regressions include unearned income, dummy variables for the education of both parents, whether or not a mother or father exists and a dummy variable for each of 15 states. Also included are the age (and age squared) of the household head (in the nutrient regressions), dummies for the age of the mother (in the fertility and survival regressions), and dummies for age and sex of the child (in the anthropometric regressions). Both parents' unearned incomes are significantly and positively associated with household per capita calorie and protein intakes although the relationship is quite nonlinear.13 In fact, the income pooling hypothesis cannot be rejected in the calorie regression with linear income terms; relaxing the linearity restriction results in a rejection of the hypothesis. In the protein regression, the equality of income effects is rejected in both cases. Furthermore, the effect of maternal income on nutrient demand is between four and seven times larger than income in the hands of fathers (evaluated at mean household unearned income). Relative to men, women apparently direct more resources under their control toward improving household nutrition. Both men and women use unearned income to reduce fertility and increase the probability that their children survive although the male income effects on survival are not significant. The absolute magnitudes of women's income effects are much larger than men's: almost 20 times bigger for survival rates in both the linear and quadratic models. The income pooling hypothesis is again rejected in all cases.
Mortality risk is a rapidly declining function of a child's age and so it would be desirable to control for exposure in these regressions (Trussell and Preston 1982) . In the absence of information on which to compute these controls (such as age at first marriage or even age at first birth), the estimates for younger women may be misleading to the extent that more educated, higher-income women tend to delay child-bearing, thus imparting a positive bias in the estimated income coefficients. Among older women, failure to standardize is unlikely to have much impact on the estimates and so the regressions have been repeated for women who have completed their fertility (45-55 year olds). The results are virtually identical: the impact of parental income is not the same on either fertility or child survival.
Mother's unearned income also positively affects both anthropometric outcomes; father's income is associated with taller children. In both cases, linearity of the income effects cannot be rejected. Maternal income effects are four to eight times bigger than paternal effects. In the anthropometric regressions, the equality of income effects can only be rejected in the weight for height regression. Unearned income accruing to other household members positively affects height for age and is associated with lower fertility; the estimates are quite close to those of father's unearned income. The hypothesis that income effects of mothers, fathers, and others is the same is rejected in all cases except height for age.
If the impact of income on the six health outcomes is not linear then differential estimated income effects may be due to differences, across the income distribution, in the proportion of men and women who report any unearned income. The income effects have been reestimated conditional on the mother or father reporting positive unearned income.14 Mother's income still has an (absolutely) bigger effect on health outcomes than father's income (Table 3 ) and these differences are significant in the protein intake, fertility, child survival, and weight for height regressions. Permitting quadratics in income, then the estimated income effects are significantly different in both the nutrient intake regressions (with F2,27502 statistics of 10.21 and 33.13 for calories and protein, respectively). Even conditional on reporting any unearned income, that under the control of women has a bigger impact on health than income in the hands of men.
Unearned income, as measured above, includes income from social security and pensions, thus probably incorporating past labor supply behavior. For each respondent in the survey, it is possible to identify income from physical and financial assets; asset income is a more appealing measure of nonwage resources although not even it is purged of previous labor supply and savings decisions. More important, perhaps, very few people report any asset income-about 12 percent of men and 5 percent of women. The lower half of Table 3 reports asset income effects on the six health outcomes. Both parents' asset income has a positive effect on calorie and protein intake; mothers' income effects are significantly bigger than fathers'. Anthropometric measures are positively affected by asset income, although not significantly, and there is no difference between maternal and paternal income effects. Fertility and child survival are unaffected by asset income. The lack of precision in these estimates is hardly surprising given the proportion of nonzero observations. Nevertheless, the nutrient intake results, at least, support those based on the broad definition of unearned income.
The common preference (or neoclassical) model of household resource allocation does not seem to perform well in these health outcome regressions. Relative to fathers (and other household members), mothers appear to be more effective at using the income over which they have control to improve the health of their families. Table 2 . Asset income is income from financial and physical assets; income measured in Cr$1,000,000.
The Journal of Human Resources B. Tests When Income is Measured with Error
In addition to the assumption of exogeneity, there are at least two problems with relying on unearned income to test the common preference model. First, according to theory, in the absence of credit constraints, the present discounted value of lifetime nonlabor income is the appropriate income measure to be included in these regressions; current unearned income is a noisy indicator of this value.15 Second, even current unearned income is difficult to measure in household surveys. Rejection of the equality of income effects may be due solely to differential measurement errors across individuals in the survey. Consider a linear version of (4) and, for ease of exposition, let there be two components to household unearned income: maternal and paternal, Ym and yp, respectively. Letting prices (and all other covariates) be M and dropping the i subscripts, then (4) Since 13 is a vector, one element for each dependent variable, X* = {XZ}, and the contamination term in (10) is common across equations, the ratio of maternal (or paternal) income effects across two equations, r and q, will be unbiased:
( 1 1 If maternal and paternal income effects are equivalent, then it must be that their ratios will also be equivalent. This is an alternative test of the common preference model which permits measurement error in unearned Rejection of the equality of the Os implies rejection of the common preference model. The test embodies strong assumptions: the regressions must be linear in unearned income and the measurement error must be uncorrelated with the correct measure of wealth, all other covariates and the regression error term. Unfortunately, failure to reject the equality of ratios does not have an unambiguous interpretation. It may be that the income effects are equal; alternatively, if mothers value all health outputs included in the test proportionately more than fathers, then the ratio of the income effects will be equal.
Ratios of maternal to paternal income effects are presented in Table 4 together with Wald tests for equality of these ratios. 16 The broader definition of unearned income is used in the top half of the table. In the nutrient and anthropometric regressions, the ratios are quite similar and the x2 statistics are small. In the fertility and survival rate regressions, the ratios differ by a factor of 2 to 3 but the equality test cannot be rejected.'7 When asset income is used, all the ratios differ by a factor of about 2 but since the estimates are imprecise, the x2 are very small.
Maintaining that nonlabor income is measured correctly, then the common preference model is not consistent with these data. The ratios of income effects are not significantly different from each other: it is not possible to reject the joint hypothesis that unearned income is measured with error, that there is no correlation among the errors and appropriate measures of wealth, that the health outcomes are linear in income and that the common preference model is correct.
VI. Testing for Gender Effects in Anthropometric Outcomes
We turn to a second, related issue: gender bias in household resource allocations and focus on child anthropometric indicators.18 Differential allocations to boys and girls can arise in both the common prefer-16. Since the tests are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrices, the matrix is not block diagonal. The level of observations varies across the three datasets and so the test statistics can only be calculated for each pair. 17. This is because the father's income effect is imprecisely estimated and the covariance between father's and mother's unearned income is high. 18. Nutrient intakes are only observed at the household level; it is not possible to test for gender preference in their allocation. Similarly, the fertility and child survival data preclude tests for sex discrimination. (Deaton 1989 ), or in the United States (Gronau 1985) .
In the case of child anthropometric outcomes, gender bias can only be identified relative to another population: standardizations based on the sample preclude tests for discrimination.'9 We shall, therefore, examine the determinants of child anthropometric outcomes and test for differential impacts of mother's and father's unearned income on the outcomes of sons and daughters. Assume mothers prefer their daughters to be healthy and fathers are more concerned about the health of their sons. The effect of household unearned income on these outcomes will be a weighted average of the impact of mother's and father's income where the weights are given by the bargaining strength of each member. If the common preference model is correct, then there is no reason to distinguish mother's from father's unearned income.
Mean height for age and weight for height of male and female children are presented in Table 5 . Relative to the U.S. standards, on average, girls tend to be taller (given age) and heavier (given height) than boys and these differences are significant. When four age groups are distinguished, girls are significantly taller (given age) than boys only among infants (0-5 months) and older children (5-8 years). Older girls are heavier, given height, than boys. One interpretation of these results would be that households care more about the health status of girls than boys. It is rather hard, however, to also explain the fact that infant boys (0-5 month (Table 6 ). Since differences in mean standardized heights and weights are accounted for by differences in intercepts, the impact of covariates should not be affected by the standards chosen.
Both parents' unearned income are positively associated with each outcome. Mother's unearned income has a significant effect on her daughter's weight for height which is about five times larger than the (significant) effect on her son's weight: this difference is also significant. Although the effect of the mother's income on height is larger for daughters, it is not significant for either child. Relative to the effect on daughters, father's unearned income has a significantly bigger effect on his son's weight for height and a slightly larger effect on height (but this difference is not significant). In spite of this evidence for gender preference, in the case of both sons and daughters, mother's income has a bigger impact on heights and weights than father's income. The hypothesis that income from each source has the same impact on either boys' or girls' weight for height is rejected: the common preference model of household resource allocation fails to be supported. If there is no gender preference, then the impact of either parent's education should be the same for both sons and daughters. Mother's education has a bigger impact on daughter's than son's height; father's education affects son's height more. For mothers, the differences are individually significant at low levels of education but disappear as education increases; in the case of fathers, the differences are significant only at higher levels of education. The weight for height regressions suggest similar patterns although parental education tends to have a small and seldom significant effect.
Mothers appear to devote resources to daughters and fathers to sons and, in many cases, the differences are significant. There is, then, evidence for gender bias in the allocation of resources and this evidence is more subtle than that considered in most other studies which only compare levels of outcomes.
VII. Conclusions
The common preference model of household resource allocation postulates that all income is pooled and a dictator determines the allocation (or all household members have the same preferences): the effect of income under the control of different household members should be the same assuming it is measured without error. An equality restriction on unearned income effects is rejected for five of the six outcomes examined: nutrient intakes, fertility, child survival, and child weight for height. Equality of asset income effects is rejected for the nutrient intake regressions.
Ratios of income effects are not significantly different from each other. This is consistent with the common preference model as long as income is measured with error. It is also consistent with differential intrahousehold It is the case, however, that unearned income in the hands of the mother is estimated to have a bigger impact on her family's health than income attributed to the father. For child survival probabilities, the effect is almost 20 times bigger.
There is some evidence for gender preference: mothers prefer to devote resources to improving the heights and weights of their daughters, fathers to sons. The maternal income effects for both sons and daughters are much bigger than the effect of paternal income. It may be wise for programs aimed at improving the healthiness of urban households in Brazil-and especially children-to take into account the suggestion that resources in the hands of mothers appear to have a bigger impact on household and child health than resources controlled by fathers.
